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Outcome-based Contracts as a driver for Systems thinking and Service-Dominant 
Logic in Service Science: Evidence from the Defence industry2 
 
 
Abstract 
Two outcome-based defence contracts are studied in the attempt to better understand the 
provision of services in maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) environment that is 
contracted on the outcome of the equipment, rather than the provision of equipment. The 
nature of the contract changes the dynamics of the delivery, bringing complex issues such 
as customer behaviours and involvement to the forefront, with both customer and firm 
focused on value co-creation and co-production, rather than each party’s contractual 
obligation. We uncover four areas that are crucial in the understanding of value co-
production in service delivery and analysed them through a systems approach combined 
with the application of the service-dominant logic, both considered as the theoretical 
underpinnings of service science. 
 
Keywords: Systems thinking, Service science, Outcome-based contracts, Value co-
creation, Service-Dominant Logic 
 
Introduction 
Outcome-based contracting, or its narrower equivalent of performance-based contracting, 
is a contracting mechanism that allows the customer to pay only when the firm has 
delivered outcomes, rather than merely activities and tasks (Ng and Yip 2009). If one 
considers the famous quote from Levitt where “the customer really doesn’t want a 
drilling machine, he wants a hole in the wall”, outcome based contracts considers the 
possibility of customers paying only for holes in walls, when buying a drill (Levitt 1972). 
While this might still be a little far-fetched for consumer goods, the idea of contracting on 
outcomes in B2B service contracts is increasingly possible. This is the case for Rolls 
Royce “Power-by-the-hour®” contracting for the service and support of their engines, 
where the continuous maintenance and servicing of the engine is not paid according to 
the spares, repairs or activities rendered to the customer, but by how many hours the 
customer obtains power from the engine. Outcome-based contracts have been shown to 
provide huge cost efficiencies to customers as both the firm and the customer’s objectives 
become much more aligned (Ng and Yip 2009). In essence, outcome-based contracts 
drives home the concept of value-in-use, where value is defined as the benefit the 
customer obtains through use (Vargo and Lusch 2004a; Vargo and Lusch 2008), and 
compels the firm to bring in customer usage as part of its responsibility to deliver the 
outcome.  
Bringing in the customer as part of outcome-based contracts may sound intuitively 
appealing, but pose immense difficulties on delivery. For example it is often not possible 
to deliver an outcome without the customer co-creating or co-producing the service with 
the firm. In the case of the hole-in-the-wall, the firm can’t deliver the outcome without 
the customer knowing how to use the drill in the first place. Thus, the role of the 
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customer within the firm’s delivery space requires new ways of thinking of the firm’s 
governance and the design and delivery of the service under outcome-based contracts. 
The need to deliver outcomes also drives the need for the functions such as marketing, 
IT, engineering, operations, OB/HR and strategy to be much more integrated and aligned 
towards delivering the benefit to the customer, rather than being individually focused on 
their own set of activities.  
 
Consequently, the understanding of outcome-based contracts would advance the new 
discipline of service science, defined as “an integrative discipline of engineering, 
technological and, social sciences …for the purpose of value co-creation with customers” 
(Ng and Maull 2009). Lohr describes “service science” as a hybrid field with a purpose to 
use “technology, management, mathematics and engineering expertise to improve the 
performance of service businesses” as well as  service functions like “marketing, design 
and customer service” that are crucial in manufacturing industries (Lohr 2006). Yet, there 
is acknowledgement amongst researchers that the hybrid field is not a result of 
reconciling multi-disciplinary perspectives but to investigate service phenomenon under 
an integrative umbrella of service system which, according to Spohrer et al (2007), can be 
defined as a “value co-production configuration of people, technology, other internal and 
external service systems and shared information such as language, processes, metrics, 
prices, policies and laws”. The delivery of an outcome-based contract would be an ideal 
setting through which a service system could be evaluated. Insights into delivering on an 
outcome-based contract could therefore provide frameworks necessary to advance 
knowledge in service science and service system.  
 
This paper reports on a study of two outcome-based contracts in the defence industry. 
Our study shows how outcome based contracts are an excellent example of organisations 
moving from Goods-Dominant logic to Service-Dominant logic, the latter considered as a 
theoretical underpinning of service science. Our study also reports the challenges in 
moving from the two logics which we analyse from a systems perspective, demonstrating 
the importance of systems thinking in driving knowledge in service science. 
 
The discussion of this paper proceeds as follows. After a review of related literature in 
section 2, we present our methodology and our analysis in section 3 and 4 respectively 
before concluding with a general discussion in section 5. 
 
Literature Review 
Extant literature on service is at a relatively youthful stage with some work surfacing in 
the early 1960s. Yet, the literature is already burdened with different concepts, theories 
and application both by the business and research communities. Much of this confusion 
has been attributed to two reasons. First, the word “service” is used extensively with 
multiple meanings in our daily conversations. Terms such as “customer service”, “service 
charges” and “service centres” are common everyday expressions, yet what exactly is 
meant by these expressions are very much an intuitive interpretation by the user. 
 
Second, in an effort to unify the study of services, the lack of an accepted definition for 
the word “services” amongst the services research community has resulted in numerous 
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debates on the legitimacy of its research (Heineke and Davis 2007; Thomke 2003). In 
recent years, these continued and unsolved debates have lead Vargo & Lusch to suggest 
that this difficult discussion on the definition for services has been “more abandoned than 
resolved” (Vargo and Lusch 2004a). This implies that despite commendable and 
substantial amount of published literature on this subject over the last thirty years, very 
little is understood of services at an abstract level to encourage common understanding of 
services research. Today, we find service research being pursued by various academic 
disciplines, with each examining different meanings within specific contexts. This 
ubiquitous nature of services research has to an extent, fragmented the service research 
community.    
 
Service Science. In response to the fragmentation, IBM coined and championed the 
concept of “Service Science, Management and Engineering” (SSME) in order to develop 
an interdisciplinary and intercultural approach to service research (Spohrer and Maglio 
2005). On their website, they call for an integration of four different schools; business 
management, engineering, social sciences and information systems. These schools 
represent a diverse set of academic disciplines such as marketing, operations 
management, accounting, operations research, information systems, engineering, 
economics and psychology.  
 
From an academic standpoint, service science offers a platform for the development of a 
new discipline equipped with its own set of curricula. A consensus is emerging that 
service cannot be described and understood by a single academic discipline (Glushko 
2008). Thus, service science can be defined as an integration of various disciplines such 
as management, engineering, accounting, finance and operations, with the aim of 
preparing the next wave of innovators in contributing to a service economy. Service 
science aims to develop a general “theory of services with well defined questions, tools, 
methods and practical implications for society” (Spohrer et al. 2007). However, in order 
to better understanding of the study of services under the concept of service science, there 
is a need for a dramatic shift from a goods-dominant logic to a service-dominant logic as 
proposed by Vargo and Lusch (2004). The service-dominant logic primarily argues that 
goods (tangible) are appliances used in service provision, and goods and service have a 
nested relationship. They suggest that economic exchange is fundamentally about service 
provision; in short, everything is a service. As such, they argue that customers are always 
“co-producers and co-creators” of value when compared to the traditional view of 
products where the firm and consumer are separated upon the purchase. As such, it 
appears that the customers’ roles are now moving from being isolated to being connected 
to the firm, changing from passive to active and from being unaware to being informed. 
By this overlapping of the customer’s roles in the firm’s processes, organisations are 
beginning to recognise its interdependence with the customer.  
 
Within such thinking, firms do not really provide value, but merely value propositions 
(Vargo and Lusch 2004a) and it is the customer that determines the value and co-creates 
it with the firm. Thus, value co-creation under the service-dominant logic is a critical 
theoretical foundation in the understanding of service science, as put forward in the first 
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issue of the service science journal (Vargo and Akaka 2009), as well as in recent papers 
by Maglio and Spohrer (2008). 
 
Finally, the concept of service science appears to be at the intersection of various 
academic disciplines and this suggests strong interdisciplinary research. Insights drawn 
from interdisciplinary theory as argued by Newell proposes that complex systems and 
phenomena are necessary conditions for an interdisciplinary approach to the research 
problem, adding that the issues examined must be “multifaceted and coherent” in order to 
justify such an approach (Newell 2001). An interdisciplinary approach is necessary to 
understand service as a whole, as well as balancing the need to preserve the contributions 
entities make to the Service ecosystem both in terms of interdisciplinarity in research and 
inter-functionality in practice, whilst making sense of the relationships between them 
across disciplinary and functional boundaries. This is particularly relevant when 
embracing the concept of value co-creation, where customers bring their resources to 
bear on value co-production and co-creation. Disciplines such as engineering, operations, 
ICT and even management, although aspire to be customer and value focused, often 
make certain exogenous assumptions about ‘customers’ and ‘value’ specifications and 
while the terms may sound the same, the meanings attached to them differ across 
disciplines  (Ng and Maull 2009). This complicates the understanding of value co-
production and co-creation with different disciplines assuming various degrees of 
customer involvement, as well as specifying the customer characteristics quite differently 
across different research and practice contexts. A different philosophical and conceptual 
paradigm that transcends disciplinary agendas must therefore be employed in the 
understanding of service. We argue that a systems approach is a way forward to advance 
knowledge in service science. 
 
Service research has a history of interest in service systems (Chase 1978; Wemmerlov 
and Hyer 1989) although the term was not strongly defined and negligible attention was 
paid to the underlying premises of systems theory. More recently, the developing theory 
of service science has renewed the interest in the study of service systems (Demirkan and 
Goul 2006; Spohrer et al. 2007), with researchers increasingly using a systems approach 
towards the understanding of internal structures (intra-entity service) and external 
structures (inter-entity service) that exist to support the value co-production and co-
creation process. This dynamic configuration of people, technology, and organizations 
emphasise that in a service system, the “whole” system is the primary unit of analysis and 
interactions between the components of the system (the employees, customers, 
technologies and other resources) are just as important as the components themselves 
within the system that should be configured for effective as well as efficient co-creation 
and co-production of value with the customer (Ng and Yip 2009). The more complex the 
service system, the more important become the relationships amongst the components, 
comprising employees and customers, materials and equipment information and 
technologies for as argued by Vargo and Lusch (2008) all social and economic actors are 
resource integrators”.  
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Clearly, the study of service systems is also critical in our understanding of service 
science as echoed by Maglio and Spohrer (2008). Yet, to understand what a ‘system’ 
means, a literature review on systems thinking is required. 
 
Service Systems. Systems theory has contributed substantially to the foundation and 
development of many disciplines such as biology, sociology, psychology, information 
processing and engineering. For instance, systems thinking has presence in the study of 
biology through an established movement known as “systems biology” that studies 
complex interactions in biological systems (Naylor and Cavanagh 2004) and in 
psychology, there is a long tradition of research in what is known as “Gestaltism” which 
examines the holistic function of the brain and proposes that the “whole” is different from 
the “sum of the parts”. Similarly in sociology, Parsons developed theories using systems 
theory and cybernetics to postulate that social systems treated in behavioural science 
were "open," meaning that they were embedded in social structures consisting of other 
systems (Parsons 1971). 
 
From a broad perspective, “systems” can be defined as an “entity which is a coherent 
whole”. This coherence enables a boundary to be drawn around an entity distinguishing 
the elements that are “inside” from the “outside”. Within this entity, there is a mechanism 
of control which enables the entity to keep its identity. Also, the existence of a boundary 
enables us to identify inputs and outputs that crosses the boundary. All these elements of 
the system that function together show some level of organisation beyond that of the 
random or weakly related. Therefore, an entity considered as a “whole”, has sub-systems 
and is part of a wider whole (Checkland 1981). 
 
In applying Checkland’s definition of systems there are five main elements comprising 
(a) coherent whole, (b) boundary, (c) mechanism of control, (d) inputs and outputs and 
(e) sub-systems and wider whole, we can identify a complex service system at the level 
of the whole organisation. For example, an organisation is a coherent whole that is a legal 
entity that has boundaries that are definable in law. The organisation then has managers 
that act as control mechanisms, taking inputs and producing products and services as 
outputs. Within these mechanisms, there are various sub-systems (e.g. departments). As a 
whole, the organisation exists within a higher level economic system or sometimes within 
a broader supply chain.   
 
Employing systems thinking under this context offers the researcher a number of higher 
level concepts that needs to be considered extensively. Among them are the open and 
closed systems (Bertalanffy 1972), socio-technical systems (Emery and Trist 1960), the 
law of requisite variety (Ashby 1958), viable systems model (Beer 1984) and systems 
dynamics (Forrester 2003). These are explained in appendix A and will be used to 
analyse the two contracts reported in this study. 
 
< Take in Table> 
 
Our thesis thus far has been to review the systems approach and its applicability in 
service science, particularly in light of advancing knowledge in value co-production and 
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co-creation.  The need for better knowledge in value co-production is much more 
pressing in the service delivery of outcome-based contracts as we would now explain.  
 
Outcome-based Contracts. Traditional MRO contracts are contracted under a MRO 
service level agreement where the cost of spares could be excluded, or where spares are 
included in the price (Van Weele 2002). The contractor could also provide a cost-plus 
contract provide detailed costs structures (inclusive of a schedule of cost of spares) to the 
customer to determine reimbursement with a profit percentage that has been pre-
determined (Kim et al. 2007).  Recently, there have been a growing number of MRO 
contracts that focuses on outcomes of equipment rather than the tasks involved in the 
provision of the equipment. Called Performance-Based Logistics (PBL), this mode of 
contracting is starting to re-shape how MRO service contracts are being formed. In 
essence, PBL is about contracting on performance, rather than tasks or inputs by the 
service provider. For example, in the case of Rolls Royce, the service provided to 
maintain engines is being remunerated on the basis of how many hours the engine is in 
the air – a concept known as ‘power by the hour®’. As an analogy, imagine being paid to 
deliver English lessons to a student not in terms of the number of lessons, materials etc. 
but on the basis of how many English words is used by the student after the lessons are 
over. Such outcome-based contracts focus on achieving required outcomes rather than a 
contract for the supply of a set of prescribed specifications (Bramwell 2003). In short, the 
buyer purchases the result of the product used (utilisation of service or performance 
outcomes) and not ownership of the product. Interestingly, the customer no longer 
directly manages or possibly even owns resources such as the inventory of spares. It has 
been argued that under these circumstances, and in the long term, suppliers may find it in 
their interest to invest in designing more reliable products and more efficient repair and 
logistics capabilities to increase profitability (Martin 2003). This implies that contracting 
on outcomes has an ability to elicit desired behaviours arising from the incentives within 
the contract, thus reducing the cost of MRO over the longer term for the customer.  
 
Overall, there is more equitably aligned risks and incentives between suppliers and 
customers in outcome-based contracting than in traditional contracting (Kim et al. 2007). 
As such, we are beginning to find more B2B services contracts moving towards outcome-
based incentives with hopes of witnessing significant decreases in costs, significant 
increases in customer satisfaction and the reduction of financial audits . Yet, outcome-
based contracting is not a new form of contracting. Literature shows that as early as the 
1960s, US government bodies have begun initiating contracts to optimise public 
spending. In defence contracting, questions such as addressing “incentives to produce 
good performance” and “incentives apart from profits to induce innovation” were 
subjects of discussions (Marcus 1964) to ensure that the roles of the parties concerned in 
the governance of the service contracts for the public are jointly engaged. Outcome-based 
contracts are also widely used in other public services such as health services (Shen 
2003) and transport services (Hensher and Stanley 2008). In health services, outcome-
based contracts has been promoted by the US Institute of Medicine (IOM) as a cost-
effective mechanism to manage and ensure the “effectiveness of public medical 
services’’ through funding of certain treatment outcomes. They use outcome-based 
contracts with local health centres to monitor and evaluate their performance in order to 
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‘‘redirect funds, away from less efficient programs within the communities towards 
programs which have proven themselves. Similarly in transportation services, Hesher and 
Stanley (2008) argue that outcome-based contracts are excellent mechanisms aimed at 
promoting economic effectiveness and efficiency through the life of the contract. 
 
For MRO services, there is evidence to suggest that increasing number of contracts are 
moving towards outcome-based type of incentives to ensure effectiveness and efficiency 
of both the firms’ and the customers’ resources (Bramwell 2003). Despite this growing 
interest in OBC from both the public and private sectors in terms of application, little 
research has been established in understanding the dynamic relationship between the firm 
and the customer under an outcome contract where value is co-produced and created.  
 
Although there have been several reports on outcome-based contracts (Gruneberg et al. 
2007), there are not many studies that examine fundamental theoretical issues arising 
from the delivery of an outcome-based contract. In this study, we use a systems approach 
to analyse the delivery of two such contracts so as to highlight the theoretical issues 
contained within.  
 
Context and Methodology 
In this study, we analysed two defence contracts between two defence contractors and the 
UK government (in this case the Ministry of Defence or MoD) which were based on a 
type of service contract that delivers the outcome of availability of two types of 
equipment; a fighter jet and a missile system.  
 
The two contracts analysed were awarded to 2 different organisations. Both were 
awarded for the maintenance, repair and overhaul of the equipment ‘through life’ i.e. for 
the whole operable life of the equipment till its out-of-service date. However, unlike the 
conventional MRO service contracts where the firms are paid on the basis of activities, 
repairs or spare parts used, the contracts were awarded on the basis of the availability of 
the equipment. This means that regardless of how and where the equipment is used by the 
customer (deriving value in use), the firm is obliged to deliver a set number of flying 
hours on the fighter jet and a fix percentage availability over a certain period of time (e.g. 
95% availability) for the missile system. Clearly there are huge implications when 
contracting on outcomes such as availability. First, from the co-creation perspective, the 
usage of the equipment can now have an impact on the way the firm delivers the 
outcome. For example, military equipment by its very nature is used in high stress 
circumstances and can easily be damaged  which has an impact on the availability of the 
jet (or missile). Second, while the MRO service is outsourced, the MoD had a big role in 
the partnership which is to provide Government Furnished Materials (GFX) including 
supplying physical facilities, material, data, IT and manpower to facilitate the company in 
achieving its outcomes. Thus the firm and the customer are co-located to deliver the 
outcomes, which is often the case for outsourced service contracts. 
 
The delivery of these contracts serves as an exemplar for complex service systems where 
both parties are focused on achieving outcomes e.g.. the flying hour bank of the fastjet;  
the value is co-produced with the customer (to achieve the outcomes); and the customer 
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co-creates value with the firm through the use of the flying hours of the fighter jet and 
availability of the missile system. These service contracts were operating under complex 
relationships with clients and service providers and therefore relied heavily on both 
operand (tangible equipment) and operant resources (intangibles such as knowledge and 
experiences) to deliver the outcome of the contract. As the service system grows into the 
maturing phase, the service systems become more complex. As a result, standardization, 
automation, and commoditization were needed to ensure some efficiency. 
 
We use a qualitative method to derive insights into the service delivery of the contracts. 
Qualitative research is often characterized by the use of multiple methods, which is often 
referred to as triangulation. There are a number of different methods to be used in 
qualitative research such as observation, analysis of texts and documents, interviews, and 
recording and transcribing (Dooley 2001). The logic behind using multiple methods is to 
secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question. In our study, we 
employed all four methods to extract data for the purpose of understanding the dynamics 
arising from outcome-based contracts. 
 
We conducted 32 in-depth interviews with stakeholders from the firm and the customer. 
These interviews were audio recorded and subsequently transcribed, coded and 
categorised. Participant observation on the MRO sites was also employed to document 
the interactions between customer and firm.  
 
We then analysed our findings from a “systems thinking” perspective and show evidence 
of the need for systems thinking in service research. 
 
Findings and Analysis 
 
Four key findings on Value Co-Creation within Outcome-based Contracts 
Based on the challenges that surfaced, we categorised our findings as four aspects of 
value co-creation under the outcome-based contracts. These categories are: the 
understanding of value-in-use, service behaviours and service skills, capacity in service 
value proposition and value co-creation & co-production. For each of these findings, we 
exemplify that outcome-based contracts are drivers for service- dominant logic under 
complex service systems. 
 
Understanding value-in-use  
In the data, we found that there is a need to understand value-in-use (i.e. multi-state 
benefits). This is crucial because of the way value-in-use impacts on customer 
satisfaction, costs and delivery of the service and our data showed numerous examples of 
these types of “usage-change”. For example, a pilot that is more careful about the use of 
the equipment such as “taking care when removing the communication plug” instead of 
carelessly and unknowingly flinging it, and hitting the windscreen (resulting in chipping 
glass) can save the firm £18,000 per piece of glass. Similarly, there is evidence in the 
data to suggest that when “rudders” are broken, they are simply “thrown into the sand and 
lost in the desert forever” rather than brought back to base. As one participant observed; 
“the rudder could probably be repaired for £1,000 rather than buying a new one for 
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£22,000”. In both cases, the costs savings translate to benefits for both parties. We also 
found that an understanding of usage has an impact on how the service is being delivered. 
Due to the state-contingent nature of value-in-use (Ng, 2007), the usage of equipment 
would vary, as would the service delivered to ensure the most effective usage would vary 
as well. For example, it was noted that pilots were using “cables as a foot rest”. Rather 
than moving the cable away, it was reported that the firm “put a guard over it and sort it 
that way”, hence ensuring that understanding the usage of the customer resulted in better 
service delivery and ultimately leading to higher customer satisfaction.  
 
Under this orientation, a systems approach can provide insights that underpin an 
understanding of value co-creation. In essence, if the firm and customer systems are not 
designed to  provide value-in-use for both the firm’s and the customer’s role in co-
creating value and the benefits are not made explicitly clear, both parties may not realise 
the conflicts that may occur due to different people delivering to different perceived 
value. Additionally, there is the additional possibility that the service design of the firm’s 
system for the repair of equipment may conflict with the service design of the customer’s 
system. The alternative is to consider these two systems as one combined superordinate 
system (Vargo and Lusch (2008) which will deliver the service to enable the customer to 
realise the benefits. In effect, the synergy that is created from designing the system as one 
whole (rather than two parts) creates an emergent property ‘service’ that would not be 
achievable when designing two separate systems.  
 
Service Behaviours and Skills  
In our second key finding, the study finds that the firm does not sufficiently emphasise 
the role of people in delivering value (service behaviours & service skills or embedded 
human capability). There is a high dependency on processes and activities that are 
equipment focused, without much attention on the behaviours required to deliver value. 
However, in complex service systems such as in MRO contracts, service delivery has 
high fixed costs that have a major human component. This indicates that the capacity and 
capability of human resources (operant resources) are paramount in service delivery and a 
lack of focus on human resources may result in lower or inconsistent service quality and 
an increased supervision cost due to higher transaction, monitoring, scrutiny and 
mistakes. A fully informed view capturing all information (including behavioural 
information) is necessary. For example, in our data, an employee of the firm noted that 
“if you’ve had a supplier that’s going to deliver something to your house you wouldn’t 
disown the responsibility of managing that supplier to make sure that he delivers what 
you need”. However, if we “sit back and do nothing and don’t get involved with the 
customer, they will just carry on the way and not deliver any of it because at the moment, 
they probably haven’t got their head around that they (the customer) are also a key 
supplier”.  
 
Furthermore, our data suggests that there are skills involved in coordinating people, 
changing or leading different situations, developing relationships, learning to think as a 
team, reducing distortions and misinformation, establishing trust and projecting a good 
image of the company. Many of these skills seem to be attributed to individuals and 
personalities and while individuals will always be important, they would need systematic 
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support within the design of such a complex service systems so that the service delivered 
could be better replicated. As noted by an employee of the firm; “it’s no good waiting for 
things to go wrong before we do something about it, we’ve got to be knowing, we’ve got 
to know what’s going on all the time so that we can be ahead of the game in making sure 
that the user’s always got, availability to do the job that he needs to do and we have 
readiness and availability criteria set out in the contract which are very clear about what 
we need to achieve”.  
 
This observation implies that efforts to instil suitable attitudes and behaviours arise from 
outcome-based contracts and this accentuates the service dominant logic. A shift towards 
a platform to include operant resources such as the coordination of personnel, reduction 
of misinformation and learning to think as a team between the firm and customer, ensures 
that service delivery is as efficient and as effective. This thinking resonates with the 
systems theory that stresses a “socio-technical” perspective as organisations are 
effectively made up of a combination of human and technology in a socio-technical 
system. Emphasis has to be placed on a general conclusion that the social and 
psychological aspects of work needs to be understood in the context of the task and the 
way in which “the technological system as a whole behaves”.  
 
Capacity in service value proposition  
Our third finding suggests that under complex service systems, the firm needs to have a 
clear understanding of where and how value is created within the service contracts and 
the contribution of components and resources to value (i.e. service capacity). There needs 
to be equitable focus on both equipment capability as well as embedded human capability 
in understanding the capacity for delivering the service. For instance, the firm has a fixed 
set of resources, both tangible (i.e. equipment) and intangible (i.e. people, know-how) to 
deliver on its service offerings to the customer. If the firm is to design and structure its 
capacity to deliver the service, the firm would have to understand which component of its 
costs deliver how much of value to the customer and the degree of importance of all 
resources within that system. In other words, there needs to be equitable focus on both 
equipment capability as well as embedded human capability in understanding the 
capacity for delivering the service. Hence, the service capacity of the contract becomes 
important to the firm.  
 
For example, from the interview, there was an observation that revealed the firm was 
unable to “carry out the inspection and repair because there are various loopholes in 
military documentation or military procedures that don’t allow them to actually carry out 
the inspection or repair, there’s anomalies within the military system that people don’t 
understand”. These comments suggests that it is important to understand the resources 
and components of human and equipment capability as well as the links between 
resources, costs and service attributes to employ the optimal service capacity in 
delivering the service under the contract.  
 
Under these circumstances, systems thinking considers both operand and operant 
resources. From equipment to human capability and from both actors within the firm and 
the customer, it is critical to understand how service capacity impacts upon the service 
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delivery, particularly under a complex service environment such as maintenance, repair 
and overhaul services. This relationship is non-linear, with complex feedback loops, time 
delays and amplifications. We therefore consider service capacity as a dynamic concept, 
dependant upon the specific demands of the moment. The analysis of such systems is best 
conducted through systems dynamic modelling which considers how these complex 
relationships may be modelled to provide systemic interventions that are often non-
intuitive and which lead to step changes in systems performance.  
 
Value co-creation and co-production  
Last, our study finds that the firm is focused on its value proposition and less focused on 
the co-produced value. This is to be expected as traditional contracting allows the firm to 
concentrate only on its value proposition to the customer. However, outcome-based 
contracts as illustrated earlier, are contracted on the basis of outcomes. Contracting for 
outcomes demands that the firm fulfils its obligation to deliver at a level where the 
customer is partly responsible for the service delivery. Hence, the customer’s value 
proposition in the value co-production of the contracts becomes the responsibility of the 
firm.  
 
Interestingly, our study showed that the customer’s responsibility to deliver certain 
aspects of the contract gave the firm an excuse to abdicate some of its responsibilities in 
value co-production. Yet, that does not change the fact that the firm has chosen to 
contract on outcomes, and with that choice comes the responsibility of understanding 
their customer’s value proposition, (i.e. its systems, processes, structures, behaviours and 
design) to co-produce value. As such, there is a need for both the firm’s and the 
customer’s value proposition to be understood well by the firm in order to deliver the 
outcomes under the contract.  
 
The interview data highlights that where demands of the customers are unreasonable, 
they are sometimes met with the objectives of building relationships whereas less 
unreasonable demands are tolerated as a one-off exercise. This then implies that under an 
outcome-based contracting environment, the firm is required to reflect on the service-
dominant logic notion that “the enterprise cannot deliver value, but only offer value 
propositions”. Without understanding what is required to optimise resources thorough the 
understanding of both the firm’s and the customer’s proposition to deliver better service 
at a lower system cost, may result in higher system costs due to transaction costs and 
misalignment issues such as seen from the data (i.e. completing work that is not within 
the contract, “scope creep”).  
 
In the next section, we analyse our data using a systems thinking lens.   
 
Discussion 
 
Systems Issues  
In considering the case study from a systems perspective, the central insight is to consider 
the issue of boundaries. In the case of the traditional MRO contracting, the customer was 
essentially outside the system boundary and the interaction between supplier and 
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customer was at ‘arms length’. The analogy is one of a ‘port’ where the points of 
interaction are limited and governed by well established methods and procedures. The 
customer requisitioned parts and the more predictable this became the better the firm was 
able to manage their own delivery. This in turn provided predictability down through 
their supply chain and as a whole the supply chain gained resource efficiencies. This is 
the essence of a value chain with linear linkages at each dyad. Conversely, in an 
outcome-based contract, the customer and suppliers come inside the systems boundary in 
a much more complex arrangement that is non-linear and highly dynamic. The analogy is 
one of osmosis where there are many points where information passes between the 
systems. This change may be considered as movement from a relatively closed to an open 
system and has a number of quite considerable implications. 
 
In traditional contracting, the firm seeks to close the system or ‘seal off the technical 
core’ (Thompson 1967). This means limiting the effect of variety on service delivery. 
Frei summarises these as in variety that emerges from customer inputs arriving at 
different times, wanting different things with different customers having different 
capabilities and willing to provide different levels of effort. The outcome of all this is that 
different customers having different opinions about the success of the service (Frei 2006). 
According to the law of requisite variety this variety must be matched or the firm 
becomes unviable. To do this in the traditional contracting model firms limit or attenuate 
the variety offered to the customer through pre-planned repair activities which are 
completely carried out by the firm for the customer.  This transactional model is replaced 
in a outcome-based context where the customer and firm are working closely to introduce 
variety through changing usage thus the past is not a good predictor of the future. This 
introduces variety into the system by the customer demanding different things at different 
times and having different capabilities and levels of effort. The system has therefore 
moved along the continuum from being relatively closed to open and the typical 
operations management optimisation techniques are much less applicable. Indeed some 
would go further and argue that in this highly dynamic environment the problems are not 
amenable to reduction and new thinking needs to be applied (Weinberg 2001).  
 
With the customer inside the system, both the firm and the customer have much less 
predictability. This manifests itself in higher supervision as both firm and customer seek 
to maintain control. Yet through Ashby’s law and Beer’s Viable Systems analysis we 
know that this substantially increased variety will overwhelm the supervisory  levels of 
management, for as Beer argues the variety of the environment greatly exceeds the ability 
of managements ability to cope. Each different situation will require a different procedure 
to be designed, written and promulgated and eventually the costs and delay introduced 
will prohibit innovation. The solution is to either limit the variety (essentially at the 
contract stage) or to cope with the variety by devolving the variety matching to the lower 
levels of the organisation, in practice to allow individuals considerable more autonomy. 
This is a service transformation from traditional contracting with predictability and cost 
control to a new service model which emphasises flexibility and responsiveness as a 
complex adaptive system.      
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This in turn has implications for the original contract terms and employability. In the new 
open system, the second order activity, learning, is paramount. The quicker and better 
front line employees are able to adapt the greater will be the gains. But this has 
significant implications for recruitment. Finding experienced staff who can make 
judgements on the appropriateness of solutions is more expensive both in terms of 
recruitment and future development and in their direct labour costs. These higher labour 
and development costs need to be reflected in the contract for they represent the systems 
ability to adapt to the realities of the open system. 
 
This transformation from closed to open is reflected in the case. There is a direct 
comparison between those teams where parties are entrenched in their ‘them and us’ 
mentality and those teams that achieve the gains of ‘cheaper and quicker’ that come from 
working synergistically. This brings us to further insights provided by the systems 
property of emergence. At the core of emergence lies the quote often attributed to 
Aristotle that ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’. Where the firm and the 
customer work closely together there is much to be gained for both parties over the 
alternative situation where each party seeks to maximise their own returns and overall 
gains are diminished.  
 
This has considerable implications for socio-technical systems design. The focus of the 
traditional contracting model is that of a closed system. Limited variety allows for 
predictability which allow for detailed processes and procedures to be developed. This 
leads to the applicability of specialised equipment and tightly defined job roles, and many 
of the features of rigid processes (Wemmerlov and Hyer 1989). Open systems on the 
other hand are unpredictable. Equipment needs to be more flexible, staff need to be 
adaptable and procedures are harder to specify as circumstances are changing and they 
quickly become irrelevant. The emphasis becomes less on rigidity and more on fluidity (, 
Wemmerlow, Ponsignon) with the attendant increased emphasis on technical skills, 
increased task variety and individual discretion.  
 
The combination of the movement along the continuum from closed to open systems with 
its attendant higher variety leads to a socio-technical systems design that emphasises 
adaptability in people and equipment. Understanding, this new type of system requires 
different ways of thinking. Closed systems are amenable to the methods of reduction and 
deterministic models. Open systems require dynamic models that represent the complex 
interdependencies, time delays and non-linearities to be found in these more dynamic 
environments. The models that we develop should focus less on optimisation of 
individual parts and more on understanding the ‘systemic’ limitations to improved 
performance for the whole system. This transformation of thinking will provide unique 
insights into problems that should both improve practice and inform theory development. 
 
Conclusion 
Outcome based contracts are an excellent example of organisations moving from Goods-
Dominant logic to Service-Dominant logic. However as these two cases show, they also 
provide an excellent example of the challenges in moving from the two logics. In 
outcome based contracting both parties need to come together to achieve an effective 
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value co-creation/co-production model (rather than the individually efficient models that 
prevail in G-D logic ) and in turn, they also need to develop the appropriate contractual 
mechanisms to achieve consistently high benefits that are financially viable. In addition, 
inefficiencies could arise from a combination of two local optimums rather than 
optimising globally across two systems. This then results in an increase in overall system 
costs which would make the contract relatively more expensive. Ineffectiveness could 
arise from the combination of two local optimums as well as from both parties’ inability 
to explicitly build a combined system. And as both parties focus on their individual 
system efficiencies, the transaction cost increases from the interactions. In other words, 
as both parties build more efficient individual systems, the overall effectiveness of the 
contract may suffer (due to more altercations and transactions), leading to sub-optimal 
outcomesi.  
 
A systems view would allow both parties to recognise the emergent property ‘service’ 
that emerges from the design of one service system rather than two separated firm and 
customer systems. However, the drawbacks from such an approach are that the system 
moves from being relatively ‘closed’ with the customer input being exogenous to the firm 
system to an open system where the variety of the inputs has the potential to overwhelm 
the service design of the firm (Ashby 1958). The solution is provided by Beer (1984) who 
argues for devolving the control of the system to the lowest levels in his viable systems 
model.  Only by doing so can the systems remain viable over time. In turn this has 
implications for socio-technical systems design that recognises the importance of the 
interplay of behaviours and procedures in a systems design. Finally, we also recognise 
the importance of understanding capacity to deliver. This too is a complex dynamic 
which is affected by the feedbacks and non-linearity of an open system and which 
suggest is best understood through the methods of systems dynamics rather than the 
deterministic models of closed systems. 
 
In short, this paper has suggested that the study of service science is best addressed 
through a systems approach. We have used outcome based contracting as an example of 
the S-D logic that underpins service science and considered that from a systems 
perspective. Many insights have emerged that suggest that service systems are a complex 
interplay between firm and customer that form an open system which needs to be 
designed using the techniques of Viable systems and systems dynamics.    
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Table 1: High Level Systems Concepts 
 
High Level Systems Concept Author(s) 
1. Open and Closed systems  
The notion of an open system is associated with the early work of 
the Biologist and General Systems Thinker Von Bertalanffy. He 
describes open systems as a system which has an “exchange of 
matter with the environment”,. Closed systems, on the other hand, 
are systems where no material enters of leaves it and are typically 
found in the realm of physics and physical chemistry.  
 
The discussion on whether a system is open or closed has particular 
application in the management of service systems. Consider the 
implications of taking a closed or relatively closed system view of 
an organisation or department in an organisation. Such a system 
would be deterministic and optimisable. However, taking an open 
systems view would suggest a complex and dynamic interaction of 
the organisation and its environment with undeterminable results. 
The consequences of closing the system in a technical core are at 
the centre of the design considerations associated with front office, 
back office debate developed by Chase (1978).    
 
Von Bertalanffy 
1971 
2. Socio-Technical Systems 
A major part of the systems movement that was based around the 
view of an organisation as an open system was the socio-technical 
systems school developed during the 1960s at London’s Tavistock 
Institute. Emery and Trist (1960) in their famous work on socio-
technical systems were interested in the open systems notions of 
input-throughput-output and how a system maintained a quasi-
stationary equilibrium despite changes in the environment.  
 
The Socio-Technical school drew a general conclusion that the 
social and psychological aspects of work needed to be understood 
in the context of the task and the way in which “the technological 
system as a whole behaves”.  The technology system here is taken 
to include not only the hardware, machines etc but the methods and 
procedures of work and how that work is organised in a process. 
Thus the Tavistock research identified the technology component of 
the system as playing an important part in the organisation of the 
system and that it was no longer possible to talk of a purely social 
systems composed of people and their relationships but to consider 
the enterprise as a combination of human and technology in a socio-
technical system. 
 
Emery and Trist 
(1960 
3. Law of Requisite Variety 
How a system behaves is a key question for those systems 
Ashby (1958) 
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researchers working within the general field of cybernetics. One of 
the most important ideas for service systems research is Ashby’s 
law of requisite variety. The law states that at a minimum there 
needs to be as much variety in the responses available to the 
regulator (manager) as in the disturbances that emerge from the 
environment. If there is not then the manager cannot guarantee 
acceptable outcomes and therefore keep the system viable. Ashby 
summarises the law as only variety can destroy variety. 
 
4. Viable Systems Model 
Beer (1984) applied Ashby’s law of requisite in his Viable Systems 
Model (VSM) where the term viable is used to assess whether an 
organisation is able to survive in its environment. The paramount 
viable system in an organisation (VSM has 5 sub-systems) is its 
producer system, which is the system which generates the income 
on which the organisation depends for its survival. Producer 
systems are threatened with overwhelming variety from the 
environment and have two potential options which Beer terms 
variety engineering.   
 
1. Attenuation; limiting the amount of variety on offer eg a fast 
food restaurant like MacDonald’s has a very limited range 
of offerings on its menu. If what customers want is 
something outside the fixed menu then the attenuator (the 
systems designer) has reduced operations response below 
the threshold and the producer system does not have 
sufficient variety to respond. 
2. Amplification; for example in a producer systems that only 
offers one choice of colour, for example black, we could 
amplify variety by offering the customer price promotions 
that emphasise the value in buying black or we could 
develop an advertising strategy that promotes black as 
“cool”.  
 
Beer (1984) 
5. Systems Dynamics 
Systems dynamics began with the work of J Forrester (1956) with 
his work seminal paper in the Harvard Business Review and 
subsequent book on industrial dynamics. Forrester was a systems 
thinker whose focus was on the dynamic relationships between 
entities Industrial dynamics is concerned with time varying 
behaviour in organisations. The primary focus is on how feedback 
loops, non-linear relationships and time delays have a major affect 
on organisational performance. 
 
Forrester (1956) 
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i As an anecdotal example, here is a comment from an RAF respondent who was in the 
midst of implementing ‘lean’ processes within the RAF/MoD. 
 
“same time we brought in lean processes and moves towards pulse 
production.  Now that would have caused us a challenge even if we had been 
doing it just as an RAF organisation because it is a fundamental mind change in 
terms of how you approach maintenance err so that was always going to give us 
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difficulties, however we did it.  One of the problems we’ve had is that by doing the 
two simultaneously where people have had problems implementing the lean 
changes it’s been too easy for them to go that’s [THE COMPANY]’s fault 
because we’ve partnered with the company because we are now working for a 
civilian organisation and to confuse the issues we would have had changing to 
lean and pulse production with the issues and problems we would inevitably have 
changing our mindset to work with a civilian organisation erm so that’s caused 
challenges”. 
 
